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Eastern Hard Currency Debt, 1970-83. An Overview
1. Introduction
After the spectacular credit expansion of the last 
decade, the 1980's appear to be the years in which debt 
problems will be most acute. In 1982 the outstanding 
foreign debt of the Less Developed Countries (LDCs) reached 
the unprecedented level of #600 bn, while early 1983 esti­
mates indicate some #750 bn, concentrated, for more than one 
half, among a small number of high- and medium-income nations 
According to BIS data, outstanding foreign assets of Western 
banks within the reporting area to LDCs rose from an already 
high #300 bn at the end of 1981 to some #470 bn at the end of 
1982. As long as the supply of liquidity had been abundant and 
costs were kept low, many countries had acceded to credit 
markets without difficulty; often new credits would pay off 
the old ones. As of the early 1980's, such a mix of favour­
able conditions came to an end. A rising demand for credits 
was not matched by an equally high supply. Growing interest 
rates implied an immediate deterioration of the debt burden, 
while the debt service of dollar- and sterling-denominated 
loans became more costly, due to the strengthening of these 
two currencies. A number of countries were virtually on the 
verge of collapse. In mid-1982, after having de facto defaul 
ted for two years, Poland rescheduled payments on her com­
mercial debt, deferring them until 1988. In 1982 Romania 
rescheduled some #2 bn of payment arrears, and a further #600 m 
in 1983. In the summer of 1982 some of the world's largest




























































































indebted nations - Mexico, Brazil, Argentina - declared their 
inability to meet debt obligations. In early 1983, reschedul­
ings under way concerned some #45 bn of the commercial debt 
due between 1982 and the end of 1984. In most cases, the 
repayment of principal will have to be postponed until at 
least 1986.
The effects of the crisis were not long to be felt; 
Western private bankers, who had played an important part 
in the expansion of the Eurodollar market, became more caut­
ious. New credits were curtailed. The fall in private loans 
was partially matched by the stepping up of aid from inter­
national financial institutions (multilateral aid). Bilateral 
aid (government-to-government loans) rose somewhat as well.
Eastern Europe is not by far the most indebted country- 
group. According to Western projections, by the end of 1983 
the entire CMEA debt will total some #63 bn- far less than 
Brazil or Mexico taken alone, who account respectively for 
#90 bn and #80 bp. By the end of 1983 even small Chile should 
reach an outstanding debt of #22 bn, double that of the Soviet
u  • ( ! )Union
Eastern debt, however, remains high. From 1971 to 1981 
it has passed from some #6 bn to #79bn, growing in nominal terms 
over 13 times. Real growth, although lower, remains consider­
able. In the first half of the decade, Eastern debt grew on 
average by 46% a year (more than double the LDC's rates). In 
1976 the growth rates of Eastern debt started to decline some­
what; by 1978 they had fallen below those of LDCs. Towards 
the end of the decade, the trend accelerated and in 1981 Eastern 





























































































The recent history of Eastern debt is dominated by 
the credit squeeze of 1981/82. The squeeze was caused by 
the Polish financial crisis which led to the reschedulings 
of 1982. Western credit intermediaries became more cautious, 
and borrowing became more and more difficult, particularly in 
the medium- and long-term syndicated market. Romania's pay­
ment difficulties virtually excluded Eastern nations from 
syndicated loans, as commercial credits dried up. Bankers, 
fearing potential reschedulings, reduced their exposure to 
these countries and cut interbank deposits to an extent that 
was very close to generating a liquidity crisis.
In the following pages we shall analyse Eastern foreign 
debt, the causes of its massive growth, its evolution against 
the background of international financial movements, its rec­
ent trends and the prospects for the near future. The period 
covered in this paper is divided into three parts: 1971-75 
(Section 2), 1976-80 (Section 3) and 1981-82 (Section 5).
During 1971-75 - the years of détente - East-West trade and 
financial flows underwent a most rapid expansion, as a new 
era seemed to be opened in East-West relations. With the end 
of détente, however, the interdependence of the two blocs was 
reduced : starting in 1976 the growth rates of both trade flows 
and foreign debt declined. In 1981-82, due to internal mis­
management as well as exogenous factors, the economic crisis 
exploded in the East, affecting, to a different extent, virtu­
ally all CMEA nations (with the possible exception of the Soviet 




























































































financial markets (Section 4) hardened. The fall in OPEC 
countries' surpluses curtailed the funds flowing to the 
Euro-currency markets, which had until then fuelled the 
recycling process; the supply of international liquidity 
fell, while world interests soared, causing the debt burdens 
of heavily indebted nations to worsen rapidly. Section 5 
deals with the years that followed the economic crisis of 
1981-82; particular attention is devoted to the effects of 
the credit squeeze on Eastern nations and to the adjustment 
measures that were adopted in response to it. This credit 
squeeze appears to have been harder than was warranted by 
their underlying disequilibrium. Section 6 analyses some 
of the aspects of the curtailment of Western credits to CMEA 
countries and presents some conclusions.
2. 1971-75 ; Eastern Foreign Debt Builds Up
Unlike most LDCs, Eastern Europe's debt was not caused
by oil deficits. Taken as a whole, in fact, the CMEA region
is a net oil exporter, and, according to Western estimates, is
(2 )likely to remain such until at least 1990 . The six smaller
countries are oil importers but, with the exception of Romania, 
purchase some 90% of their imports from the Soviet Union at 
special CMEA prices, based on a moving average of the world 
oil prices in the preceding five years. Only above-the-plan- 
deliveries (in the case of Romania, the entire bulk of oil 
imports) are paid at current world prices.
If Eastern debt was not a direct result of oil deficits, 
the question remains open as to what led to it. The point 




























































































sented the second decade in a row of declining growth rates. 
According to Eastern calculations, in the 1960's growth rates
had fallen by some 2 points percent, reaching 7% (4% by West-
(3)ern calculations) . Both rates may appear high by Western 
standards, but represented a setback for Socialist nations, 
which were used to much higher rates. With the exception of 
Hungary, the economic reforms of the sixties had proved to be 
a failure. The system of administrative prices, of yearly 
targets and bonuses remained untouched. The centralised 
allocation of inputs, coupled with the principle of taut 
planning, pushed enterprises to disregard the quality of 
output. The bonus system discouraged the introduction of 
new technology as in the short run it disrupted production, 
leading to a possible loss of bonuses. The R&D organisations 
worked in virtual isolation from production units, developing 
projects which were of little use for practical applications; 
more often still, the innovations did not even reach production 
units. CMEA nations appeared unable to generate the modern, 
efficient technology they needed. The passage from an extensive 
scheme of development, based on a massive irrmission of resources 
into production, to an intensive one, that envisaged a more 
efficient exploitation of the existing resources, was far from 
being achieved. In the meantime, labour and natural resources 
were approaching exhaustion. Stepping up high technology imports 
from the West must have appeared to CMEA planners as a rapid and 
expedient way to improve economic performance. According to a 
Western interpretation, it was a necessary choice, if more radi­
cal reforms at home were to be avoided. To a certain extent, 





























































































Trade flows from the advanced Western nations, which
had traditionally accounted for a modest share of CMEA overall
commerce, rose, passing from 29% in 1970 to 34% in 1975, when
they reached a peak-value. By contrast, intra-CMEA flows
shrank from their 1970 level - 60% of total Eastern commerce -
(4 )to 30% in 1975. At least initially , trade flows from the
West concerned essentially investment goods. Later on, they 
included production goods and, to some extent, food and raw 
materials, as the Soviet Union reduced oil sales to Romania 
and grain and foodstuff sales to Poland and Czechoslovakia.
In turn, Eastern exports on Western markets lagged behind 
imports, due to low competitiveness. Output quality was poor, 
while most of the six smaller nations lacked the raw materials 
their Western partners were seeking. Thus, despite efforts to 
balance trade flows, the commercial deficits of the six smaller 
CMEA nations with the advanced West rose on average by 83% a 
year during 1971-75 (see Table 3). The Soviet Union, on the 
contrary, being a large exporter of raw materials, managed to 
keep her trade performance altogether more balanced. After a 
small surplus in 1974, a peak deficit of 05 bn was reached in 
1975, but was soon eliminated.
Trade imbalances were financed with foreign 
credits. Nominal debt, including that of CMEA banks, rose from 
06 bn in 1971 to 029 bn in 1975 (see Table 5). Foreign debt 
grew fastest in Poland, where domestic development plans, push­
ing for a "dash for growth" envisaged massive imports and fin­




























































































in 1971, ranking fourth place in the CMEA region, to #7.4 bn 
in 1975, second only to the Soviet Union, who totalled a 
slightly higher #7.5 bn debt. The GDR and Romania followed, 
with respectively #3.5 and #2.5 bn.
The massive debt of Eastern nations vis-à-vis the West 
was a completely new phenomenon. As Portes put it :
"... as recently as 1970, say, it would have 
taken remarkable prescience to suggest that 
Eastern Europe would be willing to borrow from 
the West - and the West willing to lend to the 
East - a sum on the order of magnitude of #46 bn"
(5) .
Undoubtedly, Eastern needs for foreign finance were met by 
favourable conditions on Western markets. Following the OPEC 
oil price rises of the early 1970's, oil-exporting nations 
deposited their current account surpluses in European banks. 
Western financial operators, facing a period of deep recession 
at home, competed aggressively for business abroad. Thanks to 
its largely unregulated and flexible mechanism, the private 
banking system absorbed a large share of the demand. Competi­
tion among bankers led to years of low credit costs (spreads 
and front-end fees), and to long maturities and grace periods. 
Interest rates started falling in 1975 (see Table 13). Through­
out these years it was demand rather than supply which deter­
mined the size of the market.
Eastern nations, with their immaculate record of low 
debt, punctual repayments and sound debt management, found 
easy access to Western banks' loans. By 1975, commercial 
banks' loans accounted for over 60% of CMEA gross total debt. 




























































































in 1974 to #15 bn in 1975 (see Table 8). Gross liabilities 
were even higher (#22 bn) as Eastern nations took advantage 
of the favourable conditions prevailing on Western markets 
to build up a considerable amount of reserves (#7 bn during 
1974-75). Short-term loans were predominant. By 1975 offi­
cial and officially guaranteed export credits had shrunk to 
a modest 16% of CMEA gross total debt - in 1971 alone they 
had accounted for some 40% (see Table 10). Official credits 
have a more favourable maturity structure and bear lower costs 
than private ones, but are supply-determined and are tied to 
particular deals with the lending nations (usually involving 
the financing of machinery imports or large-scale investments). 
Private loans, instead, may be used to finance any payments 
imbalances, or to purchase anything (raw materials and consump­
tion goods), from any trade partner. Besides, they imply no 
conditionality or political concessions.
3. 1976-80 : The Years of Decline
From 1976 to 1981 the net debt of Eastern nations 
(excluding the CMEA banks) rose by more than 100%, passing from 
#35 to #74 bn. Gross debt reached some #88 bn, as Eastern 
nations continued to build reserves. However, after the peak- 
values of the first half of the 1970's, the growth rates of 
CMEA hard-currency debt started to decline; by 1980 they had 
reached about one half of their 1976 levels. In the early 
1980's the fall was even more marked. With the possible 
exception of Poland, the slowdown was essentially demand- 
determined, following the application of internal adjustment 




























































































the Euromarket was still liquid, as oil prices continued to 
rise. On the whole, the majority of CMEA nations maintained 
a good credit rating among Western operators.
In general, the second half of the 1970's was character­
ised by a tendency of Eastern nations to correct their balance 
of payments performance with the advanced West. The trade 
deficits with Western nations dropped from #10 bn in 1976 to 
#3 bn in 1980. Great part of the reduction was accounted for 
by the Soviet Union, who, during 1976-81, benefitted from a 
50% rise of her terms of trade with the advanced Western 
nations (see Table 7). (Soviet exports to the West have a 
higher energy content than imports). In 1980, the Soviet 
balance of trade with the West recorded a small surplus of 
#200 m.
In 1979 Soviet trade balances with LDCs turned to the
positive range. Surpluses reached some #3 bn in 1980, a good
(6)share of which was settled in hard currency
The trade performance of the six smaller CMEA nations 
was less successful. Despite their efforts, imports from the 
West continued to rise. The Five-Year Plans covering the 1975- 
80 quinquennium envisaged a cutback on the growth rates of 
imports, in order to reduce trade deficits and slow the growth 
of foreign debt. An excessive reduction of imports, however, 
could action a "bottle neck multiplier", which would cut pro­
duction, hence the supply of exports and then again of imports, 
etc. Besides, to some extent Eastern imports included also food 
and consumption goods, which were essential to maintain consumers' 
standards of living, whereby avoiding outright discontent. Due 
to economic recession in the West, exports of the six remained 




























































































(European Economic Community) trade barriers on agricultural 
products damaged many traditional exports of Romania, Bulgaria 
and Hungary. The terms of trade of the six smaller nations 
with the advanced West deteriorated as the prices of their 
exports (essentially, manufactures) remained stagnant (see 
Table 7). Moreover, trade balances of the six with the develo­
ping market economies remained in the negative range until the 
1980's.
CMEA balance of payments performance vis-à-vis the
advanced Western nations continued to deteriorate (see Table 6).
Since 1979, due to the accumulation of the debt and to the rise
(7)of commercial interest rates , the volume of interest pay­
ments had overtaken that of trade deficits; in 1981, it was 
more than double the trade gap. The possibilities of Eastern 
nations to reduce their external exposure by correcting trade 
imbalances was hindered; to a large extent foreign debt became 
a self-alimenting phenomenon.
Western BIS-reporting banks still accounted for the 
largest share of Eastern debt. From 1976 to 1981, commercial 
credits to Eastern Europe more than doubled. In 1979 Eastern 
deposits with Western banks reached the peak value of $15.5 bn, 
more than half of which ($9 bn) was accounted for by the Soviet 
Union0 In 1980 Eastern deposits remained grossly constant, while 
a $1 bn decline was registered in 1981, when many Eastern nations 
drew down on their foreign deposits to compensate for the lower 
availability of credit.
Official Western export credits were easily available 




























































































largest share was absorbed by the Soviet Union, traditionally 
a large taker of official credits, followed by Poland and, at 
a distance, by East Germany and Romania.
As of 1977, Poland totalled the largest foreign net debt
in the CMEA group. During 1976-80, due to heavy use of financial
credits, most of which were short-term, the maturity structure
of the Polish debt worsened; medium- and long-term Eurocredits
constituted a minor 2.5% of Poland's net debt. Creditworthiness
on Western markets was somewhat offuscated, as Polish officials
admitted that they were having problems in obtaining large-scale
(8)Euromarket credits because of their past heavy borrowing 
The cost-end fees and spreads applied to Poland were higher than 
those of the other CMEA nations. In 1979, spreads over LIBOR 
(the London Interbank Offered Rate) on syndicated loans ranged 
between 0.5% and 0.75% for all Eastern nations, and between 
0.75 and 1.375% for Poland. Polish recourse to official credits 
was high, but essentially covered commodity imports (steel, 
chemicals, grain), for which terms were considerably shorter 
than on credits for machinery imports.
With the exception of the Soviet Union, the debt burdens
rose for all CMEA countries. The debt-service ratios, that
reflect the hard currency export earnings absorbed by the debt
(9)service of medium- and long-term debts are shown in Table 15 
After the low levels of the early 1970's, the ratios deteriorated 
rapidly in Poland, passing from 30% in 1975 to 107% in 1980, 
followed by Romania (38%), East Germany (36%) and Bulgaria 
(30%) . Adjustment has been particularly successful in the 
last two nations, whose ratios were down, respectively, from 




























































































Debt-service ratios reflect only the payments on medium- 
and long-term debts, and are based on the assumption that 
Eastern nations would have no difficulty in rolling over 
the short-term debt. It has been noted, instead, that in 
case of payment difficulties, Eastern nations would face 
"great risks.... since short-term debt would dry up very 
rapidly and they would probably face a payments moratorium"
^ ̂  . Debt-service ratios, on the contrary, include the short-term debt; they
relate total net debt to hard currency merchandise exports.Eastern debt-export ratios reflect the sheer size of CMEA nations' indebtedness. By 1980, Poland had by far the heaviest debt burden, as her
net debt was over three times hard currency earnings. Hun­
gary came second, with a debt nearly double her exports, 
followed by East Germany and by Romania, where debt was one 
third higher than exports. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and the 
Soviet Union, whose debts did not exceed substantially ex­
ports, remained at the bottom.
4. The Crisis Matures
The debt crisis in Eastern Europe was determined by a 
mix of both domestic and international factors.
In general, a debt problem arises when a nation incurs 
into debt to an extent that is too high with respect to its 
future capacity of servicing it, given the time pattern of 
access to liquidity . In particular, it has been proved 
that for a given rate of debt amortization (which depends on 
contractual conventions and the duration of loans), unless 
foreign credits keep growing at a rate higher than the interest 




























































































If this is the case, then the service of the debt becomes a
two-gap problem, requiring that domestic savings exceed
imports by enough to cover interest payments and the repay-
( 12 )ment of principal . In other terms, income produced must
be higher than the income absorbed by internal demand. Imbal­
ances may be corrected by reducing domestic demand and/or by 
improving the balance of payments performance, i.e. by cutting 
imports and/or by diverting resources from internal use to 
export. Eventually, however, the fall in the absorption 
capacity will lead to a reduction of income produced, which 
in turn endangers the future capacity of servicing the 
debt (13).
In the case of Eastern nations, the focus is on the 
export side. Successful debt management requires that the 
economy is able to transform the borrowed resources into 
exportables or import substitutes. Moreover, no constraint 
should be faced to transform the resources freed by lower 
domestic absorption into exports - which was not the case of 
Eastern nations in the 1970's. Eastern imports from the West 
concerned essentially raw materials and high technology mach­
inery, which have a relatively rigid demand and are difficult 
to cut back. The reduction of Western imports, in fact, hurt 
Eastern economies; the drop of output growth rates, which had 
been declining since the early 1970's, further accelerated 
in the 1980's. Polish output fell by some 12% in 1982.
Since the late 1970's, the situation on international 
financial markets had started to deteriorate, as the avail­




























































































A decade of low interest rates had curtailed Western banks'
capacity of accuinulatinq capital, and most bankers faced modest 
capital-assets ratios. Moreover, the growing concentration 
of credit flows among a relatively small group of countries 
had stepped up the exposure of Western bankers to portfolio 
risks. The financial crisis of Poland - and soon after that 
of Romania - originated a chain-effect which is still oper­
ating. Fearing future reschedulings, Western bankers reduced
(14)their inter-bank lines on Eastern banks . In the most
critical moments of 1981, Poland's Foreign Trade Bank, Bank 
Handlowy, lost some #500 m in a few weeks. In the first 
quarter of 1982, Hungary lamented the sudden withdrawal of 
some #1 bn deposits and had to hastily arrange for additional 
credits  ̂ .
The OPEC oil price fall, coupled with the imposition of 
production quotas on member-countries, curtailed the current 
account surpluses of oil-exporting nations by some #45 bn in 
1981 and a further #45 bn in 1982. In 1983 the cut is expected 
to be even greater, totalling some #70 bn From 1981 to
1982, the deposits of oil-exporting nations on Western banks 
were down by over #20 bn. In the first three months of 1983, 
they fell by a further #9 bn. The growth rate of international 
commercial banks' loans fell from 19% in 1980 to under 9% in 
1982.
In early 1980, the US administration - as the British one 
had done a year earlier - committed itself whole-heartedly and 
successfully to fight domestic inflation. As a result, American 
interest rates soared, passing from 8% in 1978 to 14% in 1981.




























































































Interbank rate (LIBOR), which generally rules the interest 
rates on medium- and long-term Eurocredits, reached some 17% 
in 1980 and then fell around 10% in mid-1983. By the begin­
ning of 1982, the decline had become general, bringing some 
relief to the debt burdens of indebted nations : it has been 
calculated that for every 1% decline of Eurocurrency interest
rates, Eastern nations save some $500 m of interest payments 
(17) . Interest rates, however, remain high in real terms - 
in 1982, for instance, inflation in the US averaged a yearly 
6%. The falling inflation rates on Western markets implied 
an unexpected rise of the debt levels in real terms (many 
nations had incurred in foreign debts in the second half of 
the 1970's, when world inflation appeared likely to continue 
to rise). Moreover, the strengthening of the dollar on 
international markets made imports more expensive, to the 
extent that purchases were denominated in dollars.
TABLE 13
Average Interest Rate on Inter-Bank Deposits Reflecting 
a Basket of Euro-currencies
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981

































































































5. 1980-82 : the Credit Squeeze
Eastern nations were strongly affected by the inter­
national credit squeeze.
According to Wharton Econometrics' estimates (shown in
/ I O \Table 5b) , total net debt grew by 5.6% in 1982 with
respect to 1981, and then fell to #61 bn (minus 7.6%) in 
1982 - the lowest level since 1980. In 1983 it should rise 
to #63 on, due to heavy borrowing on behalf of the Soviet 
Union, who should regain her 1981 level - #11 bn. For the 
other six CMEA nations, the overall net debt fell by #2 bn 
in 1982 and should fall by a further #1 bn in 1983, reaching
#52 bn. The highest reductions should be those of East 
Germany (minus #900 m) and Romania (minus #700 m) - 
Romania had already recorded a #900 m reduction in 1982.
The only cases in Eastern Europe where the lower use of
foreign debt appears to have been motivated by lower needs
were Bulgaria, the Soviet Union and, possibly, Czechoslovakia.
For the remaining Eastern nations, we assume that the debt
reductions of the 1980's were essentially determined by
factors pertaining to the supply side, i.e. by a fall in
(1 9)the availability of new credits for Eastern nations
In 1981, the exports of the six smaller CMEA nations 
to the advanced West fell in absolute terms by some #3 bn 
with respect to 1980, and stagnated in 1982. The decline 
was in large part due to the Polish internal crisis, that 
curtailed her deliveries and shipments abroad by almost one 




























































































Exports to the West fell also for the other Eastern nations, 
due to low demand on foreign markets. Eastern imports from 
the advanced West rose until 1980 and then declined by £3 bn 
in 1981. In 1982 the fall was even bigger, as most Eastern 
governments undertook strict adjustment measures. Reportedly, 
the first to be reduced were the imports of investment goods, 
while, at least initially, an effort was made to maintain 
food and production goods imports. This precaution, however, 
was soon abandoned, as the adjustment concerned all types of 
imports (on this point, see section 6). The largest reduct­
ions were accounted for by Poland and by Romania, whb cut 
their imports from the West by more than one half in two 
years (respectively, by £3.6 bn and by £2.1 bn). In 1982 
the six smaller CMEA nations registered a small but signifi­
cant surplus of some £2 bn in their trade balances with the 
advanced West. Western observers, however, believe that 
such strict adjustment policies may have damaged the absorp­
tion capacity of Eastern nations. This was the case of 
Poland and, possibly, also of Czechoslovakia and Romania.
The Soviet trade balances with the advanced Western 
nations were negative both in 1981 and in 1982, due to low 
Western demand. (The Western embargo on Soviet exports, 
undertaken in retaliation for the Soviet invasion of Afgani- 
stan, appears to have had only a rather marginal effect on 
Soviet exports). In 1982, in spite of a weak demand for 
oil on Western markets, Soviet exports to the West grew by 
an estimated 8.7%. Western press reports foresee a further 
increase for 1983, when the Soviet trade balance with the 




























































































Trade balances of the CMEA nations with the developing 
market economies became positive in the early 1980's. In 
1981 the six smaller CMEA nations recorded a surplus of some 
04 bn for the first time since 1970. The latter was essen­
tially due to a reduction of Eastern imports from the develop­
ing nations; Eastern exports fell in absolute terms by some 
06 m in 1982 with respect to 1981. The decline was probably 
due to the fall of OPEC oil prices, which curtailed the demand 
of many of Eastern Europe's traditional Third World partners - 
Lybia, Iran, Iraq, the Middle East.
The Soviet trade balances with developing nations, which 
had become positive in 1979, declined somewhat in the 1980's, 
due to massive grain imports from Argentina. Export 
performance, however, was successful, as the economic and 
financial crisis of many Latin American, South African and 
East Asian nations did not affect the traditional trade partners 
of the Soviet Union (India, for instance). Moreover, Soviet 
exports to the developing nations may be understated, as they 
do not include data on arms sales, which, according to West­
ern observers, should be high. In the near future, Soviet 
imports from the developing nations should decline somewhat, 
as US grain supplies are picking up.
Intra-CMEA trade flows stepped up. According to Soviet
Premier Tikhonov, in 1981 they had reached 55% of the total
commerce of CMEA member countries . in 1980-81 the massive
Soviet shipments to Poland led to a deficit of the six smaller
nations (Soviet surplus) of some 01.4 bn. In 1982 the deficit
( 2 1 )is supposed to have declined by #250 m . In 1981-82, the
terms of trade of the six smaller nations (with the exception 




























































































OPEC price rises of 1979-80 began affecting CMEA prices. The 
price of Soviet oil rose by some 25% in 1981 and an addition­
al 26-27% in 1982. Prices of East European exports to the 
Soviet Union - manufactures, coal (from Poland) - increased 
by 7% in 1981 and by another 5% in 1982, while the prices of
imports from the Soviet Union increased by 15% in 1981 and an
(22 )additional 13% in 1982 . According to Eastern estimates
(23) , the terms of trade of the six should continue to fall 
during 1983-85, as the prices of Eastern imports from the So­
viet Union are expected to rise by some 6% a year, against a 
yearly rise of export prices of some 4%. CMEA oil prices 
should rise by 13% a year. The effect of the deterioration 
of Eastern terms of trade has been analysed by Vanous, who
calculated the intra-CMEA trade balances at constant 1980 
(24)roubles . According to these estimates, Eastern deficits 
remained grossly constant in 1980 and in 1981, while the six 
registered a small surplus in 1982.
For the CMEA group as a whole, current account defi­
cits vis-à-vis Western advanced nations declined somewhat in 
the first half of 1982, due to the improvement of their trade 
performance. For the six smaller nations interest payments 
represented by far the biggest component in the aggregate 
current account balance. Interest payments rose by approxi­
mately #1 bn in 1981, and appear likely to have risen further 
in 1982 as the sheer size of Eastern debt counterbalanced the 
decline of interest rates. Due to its comparatively low re­
course to external debt, Soviet interest payments were small 
(£1 bn in 1980, #1.8 bn in 1981), and appear to have declined 
in early 1982. In 1980 the Soviet Union actually achieved a 
surplus in the balance of invisibles of some #200 m, and a 




























































































In 1982, for most CMEA nations, net debt fell or remained 
constant with respect to 1980. The largest reductions were 
registered by the Soviet Union (less #3 bn) and by East Ger­
many (less 02 bn). Poland's debt, on the contrary, rose by 
01 bn. The latter, however, may hardly be considered a crea­
tion of new funds, in view of the capitalization of overdue 
interest. In 1983, apart from further Polish reschedulings, 
no new credit is forecast, except for the Soviet Union, who 
is expected to borrow some 03 bn.
CMEA net liabilities with Western commercial banks 
reached a peak-value of #46 bn in 1981, after which they 
fell to #37 bn in 1982, as Eastern countries experimented 
a very tight credit squeeze on Western markets. Two-thirds 
of the 1982 decline was accounted for by the six smaller 
nations. The largest reductions were registered in Poland, 
where net liabilities fell by #1.6 bn, followed by East Ger­
many (less #1.4 bn) and by Hungary (#1 bn). The decline of 
CMEA gross liabilities was somewhat lower (#7 bn), as Eastern 
bankers incremented their hard currency deposits with Western 
banks which, specially for the six smaller countries, had 
reached rather low levels in the early 1980's. In respect 
of end-1981, deposits rose by #1.6 bn for the Soviet Union, 
by #200 m for Poland and by #100 m for Bulgaria; they declined 
slightly for the other countries. East Germany drew down on 
her deposits in the first half of 1982, but managed to incre­
ment them somewhat in the second half of the year. Great part 
of the decline of Eastern net liabilities took place at the 
expense of short-term liabilities ("up to and including one 
year", in the BIS definition). The percentage of CMEA short­
term loans passed from 42% of total commercial debt in 1981, 




























































































term liabilities, including loans over two years, passed 
from 33% in 1981 to 37% in 1982, determining an improvement 
of Eastern debt's time-profile. By far the largest shift 
to long-term credits was that of Romania, who passed from 
#1.4 bn in 1981 to #4.3 bn in 1982. In 1982, both the 
Soviet Union and Poland reduced their short-term liabilities 
with respect to 1980, while leaving long-term liabilities 
grossly constant.
( 25)The volume of syndicated medium-term bank credits 
is reflected in the BIS data to the extent that the banks 
participating in the syndication are in the BIS-reporting 
area. However, information on syndications is a useful 
indicator of recent commercial borrowing. From 1979, syn­
dicated bank credits to Eastern nations (Table 9) have been 
falling by some 50% a year, passing from #47 bn in 1979 to 
#7 bn in 1982, the lowest level since 1973. Bulgaria has 
practically withdrawn from the market since 1980, probably 
due to lower credit needs. For opposite reasons, Poland 
has been squeezed out of the market since 1981, together 
with Czechoslovakia - the latter, however, is believed to 
have kept a relatively good credit rating among Western 
bankers. Romania followed in 1982. By the end of 1982 
East Germany's access to syndicated loans amounted to a 
negligible #690 m. The only country which managed to keep 
medium-term credits in line with earlier levels was Hungary, 
thanks to her able bankers. In 1982, with #5 bn of syndicated 
loans, she accounted for more than half of Eastern Europe's 
medium-term credits. Borrowing costs rose during 1981, 




























































































Undisbursed credit commitments reflect the credits 
which have been negotiated with commercial banks for future 
use; they indicate the amount of credit that the borrower 
can dispose of without further applications. The value of 
undisbursed credit commitments is often used as an indicator 
of a borrower's ability to obtain new loans. The recent 
evolution of Eastern credit commitments (Table 12) is con­
sistent with the stiffening of Western markets. The volume 
of Eastern total undisbursed commitments (including the USSR) 
fell in 1982 to its lowest level since 1978. The biggest 
reductions were those of Poland (minus #1 bn during 1981/82), 
followed by Bulgaria, Romania and Eastern Germany. Credit 
commitments rose slightly in Hungary and in Czechoslovakia. 
The Soviet Union, who had reduced her undisbursed credit 
commitments in 1979 and in 1980, managed to raise them by 
a substantial #2 bn in 1982.
Eastern nations' use of official and officially guaranteed 
credits continued to rise. In 1981, the Soviet Union stepped 
up her official credits by some #300 m; the largest rise, 
however, was accounted for by Poland (plus #1.4 bn). The share 
of official credits in Poland's gross hard currency debt passed 
from 23% in 1980 to 29% in 1981.
In more recent times, however, Western credit insurance 
agencies may have limited their supply of loans to CMEA nations, 
given the record claims they were facing on past credits 
extended to certain LDCs and to Poland. Following the 
Romanian payment arrears, the government of West Germany 
stopped granting guarantees for business with that country, 




























































































cancelled Poland from the list of countries eligible for 
export guarantees. Japanese and British agents also appear 
to have removed insurance from (or restricted credits to) 
a number of countries, including Poland and Romania. Further­
more, Western governments may be unwilling to extend credits 
to foreign nations, due to their own public sector borrowing 
needs. Official credits may also be limited by Eastern 
demand, given that most CMEA nations - except for the Soviet 
Union - are curbing investment projects - the latter being 
financed principally by means of official credits. In turn, 
great part of the official credits to the Soviet Union appears 
to be tied to the Urengoi gas pipeline project.
In late 1981 the OECD member countries of the so-called
( 26)"consensus" group raised their interest rates on official
credits to 10.0 / 12.4%, in order to keep them in line with 
those prevailing on the Euromarket. The Soviet Union, Czechos 
lovakia and East Germany were transferred to the "relatively 
rich" group, for which the minimum applicable rates are 12.15/ 
12.4%. The other CMEA nations fall in the "intermediate" 
group, for which the rates are : 10.85 / 11.35%.
The intra-German "swing credit" facility was extended
until the end of 1985, but will undergo a gradual reduction
from its original level of DM 850 m per year. On 1 January
1983, it was brought down to DM 770 m; in 1984 it will reach
(27 )DM 690 m, and DM 600 m in 1985 . In the summer of 1983,
the West German government announced that it would guarantee
an unprecedented commercial bank loan to East Germany of
(28 )DM 1 bn, equal to $388 m
Unlike many LDCs , Eastern nations have not issued 




























































































limited to only two nations : Hungary and Poland (see Table 
14). In the future a stepping up of this source of financing 
could be forecast, as Eastern integration in the international 
financial system grows. On the other hand, the general credit 
squeeze experimented by Eastern nations in recent years may 
reduce Western willingness to purchase eventual Eastern bond 
issues.
Multilateral aid - i.e. loans from international financial 
institutions, like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
World Bank and related institutions, is limited to the two 
member countries - Romania (a member since 1972) and Hungary, 
who joined the IMF ten years later, in May 1982. Poland 
applied for membership in mid-1982 and its acceptance is 
still underway. Romania has benefitted from multilateral 
aid since 1975 (see Table 17). In 1981 she recorded a total 
debt of #1.7 bn, but since then no new credit facility has 
been announced. In 1982 Hungary, a fresh IMF member, obtained 
a stand-by credit of some #500 m (SDR 475 m). Gold sales by 
the Soviet Union rose sharply in 1981, reaching a level of 
some 300 tons, valued at around #4 bn. Further sales of 
some 50/80 tons took place in the first quarter of 1982, 
as the Soviets attempted to counterbalance the continuing 
fall of gold prices.
Gold Sales by the Soviet Union__________Table 18




150 150 350 450 450 290 90 300 50-80
Value 
(# bn)
0.6 0.6 1.4 1.8 3.0 2.8b 1.8b 4.0b 0.6-1.0b





























































































a : 1st quarter
b : Estimated, using London prices for 1979-82.
The consideration of the debt-service and the debt-
export ratios does not add much to what has already been
said. Since 1980, the situation of Poland, Bulgaria, East
Germany and the Soviet Union appears to have improved. In
particular, Poland managed to reduce the debt-service ratio by
almost one half in 1981/83, thanks to the fall of interest 
rates. The reduction of the Polish debt-service ratio, however, 
reflects also her lower payments due to payment arrears.
Ihe Polish debt-export ratio (see Table 16) remained high
and rose further in the early 1980's, testifying to the
maintenance of a high level of foreign
debt. Romania has rather high rates as of 1980, but a slight
improvement is expected for 1983. The Soviet Union and
Bulgaria present the lowest lpvels among Eastern nations
for both ratios.
6. Conclusions
Contrary to the widespread view according to which CMEA 
nations are on the verge of bankruptcy, the picture outlined 
in Section 5 points out that Eastern Europe is not in a bad 
shape economically. Regardless of how precarious the situation 
may have been in the late 1970's, when most of the debt matured 
simultaneously, by now Eastern nations have gone a long way 
into adjusting their imbalances.
The nature and extent of the adjustment has been analysed 
by Various, who has estimated the growth rates of income produced 




























































































product and of the demand for consumption and investment goods 
in Eastern nations over 1971-75, 1976-80 and in 1981 and 1982). 
In 1981 and in 1982, the growth rates for both income produced 
and income used fell below the levels of 1976-80 and, even 
more, below those of 1971-75. Growth rates for income
produced, however, fell less than those for income used as 
"the share of national income produced devoted to a reduction
of external indebtedness steadily increased during 1981-83."
( 2 9) . Vanous analyses the adjustment process by splitting 
income used into its two components : consumption and invest­
ment. In 1981 all Eastern nations - except Poland - managed
to maintain the growth rates of consumption around the averagelower than thoselevel of 1976/80 (which were already/prevailing in 1971-75).
On the other hand, the growth rates of the investment fund 
fell drastically in all Eastern Europe (with the exception 
of Bulgaria). In 1982, the hardest year of adjustment, the 
growth rates of consumption fell together with, though not as 
fast as, those of investment, as the reduction of domestic 
absorption took place essentially at the expense of invest­
ments. The adjustment (as we have seen in Section 4) also 
involved reducing the gap on the side of hard currency trade
balances. CMEA exports to the West recovered in 1982, while
( 3 0 )imports had been cut as of 1981
The current financial crisis of many LDCs has put the 
problem of Eastern debt in a new perspective, and has opened 
a number of questions. In the first place, there is the 
problem of the attitude of Western lenders vis-à-vis Eastern 
nations, on the one side, and other market economies on the 




























































































different ways. Despite credit to Eastern nations being
curtailed, loans continued to flow to other heavily indebted
nations, particularly to Latin America, even after the summer
of 1982, when it was quite clear that debts had accumulated
well beyond future repayment capacity. According to Western
estimates, many Latin American nations will require additional
loans in the order of billions of dollars even only to meet
(31)interest payments in 1983 and in 1984
( 32)instead - possibly also Poland
Eastern nations, 
- need only refinancing 
and "rolling over" of their present debt. Moreover, Latin 
American nations are only now starting to undertake those 
adjustment measures that Eastern countries had adopted back 
in 1981-82.
The problem is then posed as to what are the factors
that determine this disparity among lending to LDC s or to
CMEA nations in the eyes of Western credit agents. One
possible difference is that Eastern nations are generally
not members of international financial organisations and
therefore are not eligible for the low-cost bridging loans
that in the short run sustain many economies facing balance-
of-payments difficulties. At present, only Romania and
Hungary are IMF members, but then, one gathers the impression
that membership for a centrally planned economy is somewhat
different than for a market economy. In other words, could
we "envisage Fund missions to Warsaw, Budapest, or Sofia,
( 33)prescribing stabilization plans?" . To be sure, the times
in which the Soviet Union could oblige its CMEA partners to 
resign from their membership to international organisations 
are far behind. However, although Moscow may be happy to see 
her partners receive loans on favourable terms, nevertheless 




























































































"agents of capitalism" . This makes it unlikely that
an IMF-agreed package of adjustment measures may be adopted 
in a CMEA nations without the close supervision and the 
consensus of the Soviet Union.
Indeed, IMF membership may prove to be a crucial issue 
in the near future. At the end of 1982, due to the fall in 
their surpluses, OPEC nations started reducing their flows 
to the Euromarket (OPEC nations' deposits on BIS-reporting 
banks were down by 07 bn in the first trimester of 1982) .
On the other hand, surpluses rose - or, at any rate, deficits 
fell - for those oil-importing countries, essentially indus­
trialised ones, that were ready to benefit from the opportu­
nity to curb their current account expenditures. It appears 
unlikely that these countries will release substantial parts 
of the newly gained (or regained) surpluses to finance the 
recycling process on the Euromarkets. Western nations, in 
fact, have high absorptive systems - higher, at any rate, 
than those of OPEC countries in the mid-1970's. Domestic 
absorption, moreover, appears likely to be stepped up by 
the recovery actually under way in the West.
In the near future, international financial organisations, 
principally the IMF, the World Bank and related organisations, 
will probably be called upon to act as major agents in the 
recycling process. Meanwhile, the IMF has expanded its lending 
activities, as total commitments passed from 09 bn in 1980 
to #15 bn in 1981. Pressure has been mounting to increase 
the IMF's primary source of funds, country-member quotas, the 
real value of which had been curtailed by world inflation in 
the 1970's. In 1983 alone, two quota revisions should take 





























































































pleted; the other is still under way. Proposals have been 
advanced to widen the range of IMF intervention policies, 
in order to include longer-run lending at concessional terms.
It has been suggested that tne IMF may arbitrage conflicts 
between creditors and debtor countries, guaranteeing the 
interests of the exposed banks by defining and monitoring 
the implementation of adjustment policies in the debtor 
nations.
Moreover, we put forward the hypothesis that there may 
exist to some extent a sort of "virtuous circle" whereby, 
after the panic, the confusion and the uncertainty experimented 
in 1981 and 1982, the IMF is gradually assuming in the eyes 
of lenders the role of an international guarantor. Western 
credit agents, in other words, may feel encouraged to concede 
credit once an adjustment package has been agreed upon, and 
is being implemented under the supervision of the IMF. If 
this is the case, Eastern Europe is excluded from the bene­
fits of this "virtuous circle".
Until not long ago, a "theory" circulated among Western 
businessmen, according to which Eastern countries were 
protected by the "umbrella" of the Soviet Union's economic 
potential. Debt default was therefore considered unlikely, 
as a Soviet top-priority aim was believed to be that of 
avoiding at any cost that the international prestige and 
creditworthiness of a Socialist nation should be damaged.
The Polish and Romanian debt crises, which took place without 
any outright rescue on behalf of the Soviet Union, have 
somewhat discredited this theory; by now most Western 
businessmen believe that the six smaller CMEA nations are 




























































































In the near future, we see no tendency towards a major 
revival of international lending to Eastern nations, especi­
ally to the six smaller ones. Eventually, when the world 
demand for oil and oil prices will have risen, financial 
markets will recover and so will the eastward money flows. 
Meanwhile, Eastern Europe faces a period of protracted 
economic recession, with falling - sometimes even negative - 
growth rates. In more than one case - Poland, but possibly 
also Czechoslovakia and Romania - adjustment measures have 
reduced the absorptive capacity of the systems, while the
fall of Western imports may have given life to a "bottleneck 
( 35)multiplier" , whereby a fall of imports implies a reduc­
tion of output,and hence of the supply of goods for export, 
and then again of imports, and so on, amplifying the initial 
shocks. Poland, which alone accounts for half of Eastern 
net debt, is seeking a rescheduling with Western bankers 
for her 1983-85 debts. Romania is negotiating delayed 
payments on debts due this year, while next year's payments 
are uncertain. Adjustment measures, however, are having 
their effect even in these two nations. Poland's slight 
surplus with non-socialist nations in 1982 will probably 
be maintained, indeed increased, in 1983, while her perfor­
mance with the other CMEA partners may have been much more 
successful than what appears, if due account is taken of her 
falling terms of trade with the Soviet Union. Like all hea­
vily indebted nations, Poland stands to benefit from the 
falling interest rates, and she may receive new impetus if 
her IMF membership request is accepted. Polish debt-service 
ratio is falling and, although the net debt to hard currency 
exports remains high, the rescheduling of Polish debt has 
greatly improved its time-structure. Thus, it may be possible 




























































































requiring new net credits, but only by rolling over the 
existing one. This is certainly the case of Romania, who 
may well pick up payments in 1984. The other nations of the 
Socialist bloc are nowhere near bankruptcy; instead, they 
are suffering for their virtual exclusion from new hard 
currency loans. Certainly, the current international debt 
crisis broke in Eastern Europe in the first place, and 
probably the whole group is suffering from a "Polish whip­
lash effect". In some Western circles, the weakening of 
Eastern Europe is viewed as a positive prospect for the 
advanced West. It is argued that, in times of economic 
crisis, Eastern - principally Soviet - military targets 
undergo a necessary reduction. At the same time, falling 
growth rates compel Eastern planners to shift resources 
away from the consumption goods sectors, spreading popular 
discontent for the lower standards of living throughout 
the bloc and leading eventually to the introduction of 
political and economic reforms. Past evidence, however, 
has shown that popular discontent is more likely to be 
associated with a tightening rather than a loosening of 
the centre's grip over the system. In general, a moment 
of economic crisis is possibly the least suitable for a 
major economic reform. Moreover, economic difficulties 
tend to reinforce economic ties within CMEA, and thus the 
political dependence of the six smaller nations on the 
Soviet Union - a result which may only please Moscow.
In conclusion, further credit curtailment will lead 
to a decline of Eastern growth rates, stagnation or a fall 
in consumers' living standards. This, in turn, reduces 





























































































In this paper, "Eastern Europe" or "CMEA countries" comprise 
the East European member countries of the Council of Mutual 
Economic Assistance (CMEA) -
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union.
"Industrialized Western Nations" (often referred to as 
"the West") and "Less Developed Countries" (LDC s ) are 
defined according to the standard IMF classification 
adopted in December 1979. LDC s (or "developing countries") 
are divided into two groups - "oil-exporting countries", 
and "non-oil-exporting countries".
For a list of the countries of each group, see IMF,
World Economic Outlook (1981), Appendix B, Statistical Tables.
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(1) Projections for CMEA countries are taken from Vanous 
(1983) and are reported in Table 5.b; those for Latin America 
are taken from The Economist, 30 April 1983.
(2) Betkenhagen (1983).
(3) Estimates taken from Holzman (1976).
(4) Calculations based on U.N. data. See Tables 1/2.
(5) Portes (1977), p. /53.
(6) There is evidence that part of intra-CMEA flows was being 
settled in hard currency as well, but there is no precise data 
on exactly how much. As of 1974, however, the Soviet Union 
registered surpluses with her Eastern partners.
(7) Interest rates on medium- and long-term Eurocredits, which 
constitute a large part of Eastern debt to commercial banks, 
are revised every three, six, nine or twelve months, in order 
to keep them in line with short-term rates (only official 
credit rates are kept constant for the entire period of the 
credit) .
(8) Zoeter (1977).
(9) Many authorities underline the limits of debt service and 
debt export ratios as indicators of creditworthiness. Tables 
15 and 16 should be read keeping in mind these limits. For 
an analysis of the two ratios, see Holzman (1981).
(10) Lawrence Brainard, cited by Zoeter (1977).
(11) Domar (1957). Domar's proof is related to the inflow of 
foreign investment rather than to foreign loans, but the 




























































































(12) This may be seen through the following standard national 
income identity :
S + GCI = I + DS + X - M (1)
where S and I are current domestic savings and current 
investment, X and M are the quantities exported and imported, 
GCI is the inflow of gross capital and DS is the debt service. 
Rearranging (1) we get :
(S - I) - (X - M) + GCI = DS (2)
where (S - I) is the gap between savings and investments and 
(X - M) is the gap between exports and imports.
(13) Let A be the absorption capacity of a nation (internal 
demand) given by consumption (C) and investment (I).
A = C + I
In the absence of stocks, domestic absorption is also equal 
to income produced (Y) plus imports, net of exports :
A = Y + M - X
and
Y - A = X - M
which is again our two-gap problem.
(14) The interbank market is the mechanism through which 
banks dispose of their excess liquidity by placing surplus 
deposits with other banks. Deposits may last from anywhere 
between one day and one year.
(15) A 0300 m short-term credit arranged with Western central 
banks, in addition to a 0210 m credit from the BIS did not 
manage to cover the entire sum of withdrawals.
(16) OAPEC (Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries) 





























































































(18) Wharton's data is somewhat lower than the figures of 
Table 5; growth rates, however, are grossly consistent. For 
a discussion of the methodology at the basis of the two sets, 
see Appendix I.
(19) See also on this point Vanous (1983) .
(20) See The Financial Times, 7 July 1982.
(21) Wharton Econometric's estimate. See Vanous (1983).
(22) Vanous (1983).
(23) Reported by The Financial Times, 5 May 1982.
(24) Vanous (1983).
(25) Syndicated loans are set up by a number of commercial 
banks, in order to spread the risks on credits covering 
large amounts, or long time periods (over one year). In this 
instance, commercial banks (which collect savings on a short­
term basis) act as investment banks, conceding long-term 
credits.
(26) Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export 
Credits.
(27) The Financial Times, 19 June 1982,
(28) The Herald Tribune, 16 July 1983.
(29) Vanous (1983), p. 9.
(30) The fall of imports mentioned in paragraph 5.1 is in 
nominal terms. Due to the overvaluation of the dollar, real 
reductions have been even more drastic.
(31) The Financial Times, 9 May 1983.































































































a discussion of the IMF's role in the adjustment- 
in problem countries, see Payer (1974).
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CMEA Net Hard Currency Debt, 1980/1983 Table 5b
(billions of U.S. dollars).
1980 1981 1982 X1983
Bulgaria 2.5 2.1 1.8 1.7
CechoSlovakia 3.4 3.4 3.2 3.2
GDR 11.2 11.0 9.2 8.3
Hungary 5.8 6.2 6.2 6.0
Poland 22.0 23.2 24.1 24.8
Romania 9.3 9.7 8.8 8.1
Eastern
Europe 54.2 55.6 53.3 52.1
USSR 8.7 10.8 8.0 10.7
Total 62.9 66.4 61.3 62.8
H
Forecast of Wharton Econometrics, Centrally Planned Economics 
Service.






























































































Estimated Balance of Payments of CMEA Nations with the Developed Market 
Economies
(billions of U.S. dollars).









1975 - 11.2 - 0.7 — 1.4 - 11.9
1976 - 10.0 - 0.6 - 1.8 - 10.6
1977 - 7.1 - 1.1 - 2.4 - 8.2
1978 - 6.4 - 1.9 - 3.5 - 8.3
1979 - 4.1 - 2.6 - 5.2 - 6.7
1980 - 3.0 - 4.5 - 7.2 - 7.5
1981 - 4.5 - 5.5 - 8.6 - 9.7
EASTERN EUROPE
1980 - 3.2 - 4.0 - 5.4 - 7.1
1981 - 3.3 - 4.3 - 6.1 - 6.6
Jan-June 1981 - 1.7 - 2.1 - 3.1 - 3.7
Jan-June 1982 0 - 2.2 - 3.2 - 2.2
SOVIET UNION
1980 + 0.2 + 0.2 - 1.1 + 0.4
1981 - 1.2 - 0.5 - 1.8 - 1.7
Jan-June 1981 - 1.4 - 0.2 - 0.9 - 1.6
Jan-June 1982 - 0.7 - 0.3 - 0.8 - 1.0
EE and USSR(1)
1980 - 3.0 - 3.8 - 7.2 - 6.8
1981 - 4.5 - 5.5 - 8.6 - 10.0
Jan-June 1981 - 3.1 - 2.7 - 4.3 - 5.8
Jan-June 1982 - 0.7 - 2.9 - 4.4 - 3.6
(1) Includes estimated CMEA banks’investment income payments with western 
nations.
Sources: United Nations, Economic Bulletin for Europe (1980) vol. 32, n. 1
for years 1975/1978. United Nations, Economic Bulletin for Europe (1982) 
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Maturity Distribution of CMEA Assets, 1981/1982 Table 11
(billions of U.S. dollars).
19 8 1 . 19 8 2
Up to and 
irci. 1 ̂ear 
(A)
CXrer 1 year 






BULGARIA 1.1 0.3 0.6 1.1 0.4 0.4
CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1.2 0.3 1.5 0.9 0.2 1.5
GDR 4.6 1.6 2.9 3.5 1.2 2.7
HUNGARY 3.1 0.6 3.5 2.2 1.0 3.0
POLAND 5.5 1.9 5.3 4.6 1.4 5.8
ROMANIA 1.8 0.5 1.4 1.6 0.3 4.3
USSR 8.2 0.9 4.7 6.6 1.0 4.3




























































































Undisbursed Credit Coirnitments to CMEA Nations, 1978/1982 Table 12
(millions of U.S. dollars).
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
BULGARIA 412 282 479 584 321
CZECHOSLOVAKIA 300 291 295 224 284
GDR 1.231 1.413 1.505 1.735 1.176
HUNGARY 428 415 669 353 489
POLAND 4.409 3.902 3.870 1.797 674
ROMANIA 1.190 806 1.050 478 416
EAST EUROPE 7.970 7.109 7.868 5.171 3.354
USSR 4.144 2.827 1.722 1.977 3.859
TOTAL 12.124 9.940 9.601 7.148 7.219





























































































External bond Offerings of Some CMEA Nations 
(millions of U.S. dollars)
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
HUNGARY 174.6 0 0 50.0 20.0
POLAND 80.9 30.0 81.0 0 0
TOTAL 255.5 30.0 81.0 50.0 20.0(of which: floating 
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IMF and World Bank Loans to Some CMEA Nations 
(millions of U.S. dollars).
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
ROMANIA 194 403 584 810 945
Source: Zoeter (1981)
IMF and World Bank Loans to Some CMEA Nations 
(millions of U.S. dollars).
1 9 8 1  . 1 9 8 2
ROMANIA of which: 1.680





- IMF Stand by
credit....... 503
Sources: The Financial Times, 06/11/1981




























































































As a rule, Eastern nations tend not to disclose infor­
mation on their foreign debt. Not even Romania, a long-standing 
member of international financial institutions, published any­
thing near the data on foreign debt and debt-structure that is 
generally required from any LDC ^  . In the winter of 1980, 
under pressure from Western bankers, the Polish Finance Minister 
reported a debt of some #20 bn - not far from the Western esti­
mates. Recently Hungary's National Bank has started publishing 
a fairly detailed breakdown of the country's external debt .
For the other nations and for the group as a whole, figures are 
uncertain.
CMEA hard currency debt is estimated by a number of 
Western institutes - the Bank of International Settlements,
Chase Manhattan Bank, the CIA, Wharton Econometrics, the World 
Bank, the United Nations, to quote only the better-known ones. 
Most institutes base their debt estimates on Eastern nations' 
estimated hard currency trade balances. It should be borne 
in mind, however, that, in the absence of first-hand data, 
there is a good degree of speculation in Western figures.
The extent to which trade with LDCs and intra-CMEA flows are 
settled in hard currency is much debated in the West. Wharton 
Econometrics, for instance, considers a given percentage of 
Eastern trade flows to be settled in hard currency. The CIA, 
on the contrary, identifies the developing nations with which 
Eastern nations trade in convertible currencies and then esti­
mates the trade flows on the basis of the bilateral data. (This 
does not necessarily imply that the CIA method is more accurate 
than the former, given that a large portion of CMEA flows to 
LDCs cannot be identified by country of destination). Intra-




























































































CMEA hard currency flows are estimated independently. Trade
with the West is generally considered to be settled entirely
u (iii)m  hard currency
Due to different calculating techniques and to qualita­
tive judgements, Western estimates of CMEA indebtedness for a 
given year range from anywhere between a handful of millions 
to several billion dollars. A sample of the differences among 
some of the most diffused Western estimates is given in Table 
A.1. Figures of Eastern hard currency debt generally include 
the following categories : credits from Western commercial 
banks reporting to the BIS, net of Eastern assets with the 
Western banks; official (government guaranteed) export credits 
(including the CCC - Commodity Credit Corporation - credits 
from the US, but excluding the intra-German "swing" credit); 
unguaranteed supplier credits; IMF and World Bank credits to 
member countries; bonds. Due to lack of information, intra- 
CMEA hard currency financial flows (including flows from the 
CMEA banks) are not taken into account. Some adjustment is 
made (for instance, by the CIA) to consider hard currency loans
from banks outside the BIS area. The latter, especially those
(iv)from Arab nations , have been growing in importance m
recent years. This paper has been based essentially on CIA 
and Wharton estimates, probably the most continuative. Fairly 
detailed information on the estimative techniques adopted by 
the CIA is provided by the CIA itself and by a number of Western 
sources. Unluckily, the information in our possession on the 
method followed by Wharton is incomplete. Thus, it is not 
possible to compare the two methods; the CIA figures are 
higher than those reported by Wharton, and the gap tends 




























































































(line "e" in Table A.l) of Soviet debt for 1980 and 1981 is 
clearly overvalued. On admission of the UN, it was based on 
the assumption that the trend in the Soviet hard currency 
trade deficit during the first half of 1981 would persist 
during the second half, which did not happen. The estimate 
was disavowed, and since then the UN has ceased publishing 
specific country data.
BIS data on Eastern commercial debt covers short-, 
medium- and long-term loans; it includes interbank credits, 
bank participation in syndicated loans, time-deposits placed 
with Eastern banks, trade drafts discounted by the banks and 
5 forfait claims held by banks . With the exception of 
the UK, prior to 1974, the BIS-reporting banks did not provide 
a breakdown of their position to Eastern nations. The latter 
was published first in 1975; ever since then the coverage has 
slowly expanded. An unresolved problem of BIS statistics is 
that some portion of the assets reported includes government- 
backed credits. A correct evaluation of Eastern debt requires 
that the BIS figures should be adjusted to eliminate double 
counting. Moreover, overall Eastern commercial debt is correc­
ted to include estimates of Western supplier credits not rep­
orted to the BIS, as well as borrowing outside the BIS area. 
Eastern nations' commercial debt prior to 1977, when the BIS- 
reporting area reached its present extension (see the footnote 
to Table 8 in the text) partially reflects the estimates of the 
assets of Western nations then not reporting to the BIS.
Officially guaranteed export credits is the other single 
most important component of Eastern debt. Unfortunately, West­
ern government organisations which guarantee export credit to 




























































































guarantees to Eastern Europe. Data on the latter are derived
from various sources and generally present a high margin of
variability. The CIA, for instance, admits that "a 10% range
(vi)of error" should be ascribed to its estimates . Further
discretionality is introduced by the fact that very little 
data on "firm commitments" is available, and thus they have 
to be estimated. ("Firm commitments" are approved credits 
for which contracts have been signed, but deliveries and 
disbursements not yet made). Information on the assets and 
liabilities of the intra-German clearing account is not 
published by either government; estimates are based on 
occasional information provided by newspapers and economic 
institutes. The clearing account includes unguaranteed
and guaranteed commercial credits net of the interest-free 
"swing" credit balance. Polish officially-backed export 
credits sometimes include the agricultural credits granted 
by the United States under P.L. 480. Polish authorities 
have been allowed to service their debt in zloty, to be 




























































































Footnotes to the Appendix
(i) Colourful examples are provided by Portes (1977). For
instance, "when asked whether he could give 'a more exact 
figure' for Poland's debt than between #6 and 09 billion, 
the President of the Foreign Trade Bank replied, 'I cannot. 
Figures on indebtedness are not published; nor are figures 
of reserves'". Euromoney, Jan. 1977, quoted by Portes 
(1977), p. 772, (n. 29).
(ii) Allegedly, when disclosed, information on foreign debt 
is not allowed to circulate among Eastern scholars; the 
latter generally rely on Western sources. In 1982, a study 
on Eastern debt by Polish scholar Czerkawski was entirely 
based on Western data.
(iii) The CIA estimates exclude the Soviet trade balance 
with Finland, because it is settled in transferrable roubles. 
Wharton estimates, on the contrary, include it, because 
Soviet-Finnish trade is conducted at world market prices
and involves goods saleable on the world market. On the 
same grounds, intra-German trade in valuta marks is gener­
ally included in the hard currency trade balance.
(iv) During the 1970's, the main business partners of the 
CMEA nations within the Arab world were Iran and Kuwait.
(v) A forfait financing is a form of supplier's financing 
whereby the bank discounts a note from an exporter, absorb­
ing the risk of collecting payment from the importer.
(vi) K. Melson and E.M. Snell "Estimating East European 
indebtedness to the West", in East European Economics, post- 






























































































CMEA Net Debt - Estimates from Different Sources 
(billions of US dollars)
1971 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
BULGARIA a 0.72 2.26 2.76 3.17 3.71 3.70 2.73 2.13 • •  •
b •  •  ■ 2.0 2.5 2.8 •  •  • • •  • •  •  • • •  • • • •
c •  •  • 2.0 • •  • 3.0 •  m m m a m •  •  • a  a a • • •
d 0.7 2.1 •  •  • •  •  • m a a • a  a 2.5 2.2 1.8
e •  •  • •  •  • a  a  a •  •  • •  m m 3.7 3.2 2.3 a •  •
f •  • • •  •  • •  •  • •  • • 3.44 • •  a 4.0 • •  a • • •
CZECHOS- a 0. 16 0.83 1.43 2.12 2.51 3.07 3.64 3.75 • •  a
LOVAKIA b •  • • 1.2 1.8 2.4 •  •  • • •  • •  •  • •  •  • • .  •
c a  a a 1.1 •  •  • 1.9 a  a a m a  a •  •  • • •  • • • •
d 0.6 1.2 a  a  a •  • • a  a  a a •  • 3.4 3.4 3.2
e •  • • •  •  • a a  a • •  • •  m m 3 .  1 3.5 3.6 • • •
f a a a a  a  a •  •  • • • • 3.44 • •  • 3.8 •  •  • ••  •
G .  D . R . a 1.2 3.55 5.05 6.16 7.55 8.95 11.75 12.64 •
b •  •  • 4.2 5.1 6.1 •  •  • • •  • •  • • a  •  • • •  a
c •  •  • 3.8 a • • 6.6 a  a  a • •  m •  • • •  •  a • •  •
d 1.4 4.8 •  •  • • •  • a  a a • a  a 11.6 12.8 9.2
e •  • • • •  • • •  a • •  • a  a  a 8 .  1 9.6 11.3 • ■ •
f •  •  • • •  • •  • • • •  • 7.80 • •  • 10.3 •  •  • • •  •
HUNGARY a 0.85 2.19 2.85 4.49 6.53 7.30 7.51 7.90 • • •
b a  a a 2.3 2.4 3.0 a a a • •  • a  a  a a  a  a •
c a a a 2.1 •  •  • 4.3 •  •  a • • • •  m m •  •  • •
d 0.6 2.3 •  •  • • •  • •  • • • •  • 6.6 7.2 6.2
e • • • • •  • a  a  a • •  • •  •  • 7.3 7.4 7.8 • •  •
f • • • •  m m a  a  a •  •  • 4.69 • •  • 8.4 •  •  • • • •
POLAND a 0.76 7.38 10.68 13.53 16.97 21 .50 24.50 24.25 • a a
b • • • 7.1 10.2 12.6 • •  • • • t •  m m • •  • • a  •
c • •  • 6.7 • •  • 14.0 • •  • • •  a •  m m • •  • • a •
d 1.1 7.7 •  •  • • •  • a  a  a • •  a 22.3 22.6 24 . 1
e a  a  a •  •  • •  • • •  m m •  m m 20 . 1 22.1 22.4 • a •
f •  •  • • • • •  •  • a  a  a 15.40 • •  • 23.0 •  mm • a  a
ROMANIA a 1.23 2.45 2.53 3.39 4.99 6.70 9.18 10.35 • a  a
b • • • 2.3 2.5 3.0 • • • • • • • • • • • • • a a
c • • • 2.1 • • • 3.2 •  mm • • • • • • • • • • a  a
d 1.6 3.1 m m m • • • a  a  a • • • 9.4 10.1 8.8
e • • • • • • m m a a  a  a •  mm 6.9 9.1 9.6 • a a





























































































1971 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
EAST- a 4.93 18.66 25.30 32.86 42.27 51.22 59.31 61.03 • • •
EUROPE b 5.1 19.1 24.5 29.9 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
c • • • 17.8 • • • 32.9 0 0 0 • • • • • • 0 0 0 • • •
d 6.0 21.2 • • • • • • 0 0 0 • • • 55.8 58.3 53.3
e • • • • • • • • • • • • 0 0 0 49.2 54.9 57.0 • • •
f • • • • • • • • • • • • 39.53 • • • 57.4 • • • • • •
USSR a 0.58 7.45 10.11 11.23 11.22 10.20 9.50 12.50 • 00
b 1.8 8.4 10.3 12.0 • • • • • • • • • • • • 0 0 0
c • • • 10.7 • • • 16.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 • • • • 00
d 1.0 7.8 • • • • • • 0 0 0 0 0 0 8.7 10.2 8.0
e • • • • • • • • • • • • 0 0 0 12.1 13.5 19.5 • • •
f • • • • • • • • • • • • 18.27 • • • 7.5 • • • • • •
TOTAL a 5.51 26.19 35.41 44.09 53.50 61.42 68.81 73.53 • • •
EAST- b 6.9 27.5 34.8 41.9 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
EUROPE c • • • 28.5 • • • 49.3 0 0 0 • • • • • • • • • • 00
& USSR d 7.0 29.0 0 0 0 • • • 0 0 0 • • • 64.5 68.5 61.3
e • • • • • • 0 0 0 • • • 0 0 0 61.3 68.4 76.5 • • •
f • • • • • • 0 0 0 • • • 57.80 • • • 64.9 • • • • • •
CMEA a 0.48 2.79 3.46 4.15 4.82 4.87 4.93 5.00 • • •
BANKS b 0.6 3.1 4.0 4.4 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
c • • • • • • • • . 3.5 • • • • • • • • • • • • • 0 0
d 0.3 2.2 0 0 0 • • • • • • • • • 4.1 3.9 0 0 0
e • • • • • • 0 0 0 • • • 0 0 0 4.0 4.0 4.2 0 0 0
f • • • • • • 0 0 0 • • • 0 0 0 • • • 5.5 • • • 0 0 0
OVERALL a 5.99 28.90 38.87 48.24 58.30 66.29 73.74 78.53 • 0 0
TOTAL b 7.5 30.7 38.8 46.3 • • • 0 0 0 • • • • • • • 0 0c • • • 28.5 • • • 52.7 • • • 0 0 0 • • • • • • 0 0 0
d 7.3 31.2 • • • • • • • • • 0 0 0 68.6 72.4 0 0 0
e • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 65.3 72.4 80.7 • 0 0





























































































a CIA, Estimating Soviet and East European Hard Currency Debt, 
June 1980.
b L.J. Brainard, quoted by Tirapolsky (1982).
c Chase Manhattan Bank, quoted by Tirapolsky (1982).
d Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, quoted by 
Tirapolsky (1982). The data for 1982 are taken from 
Various (1983) .
e United Nations, quoted by Tirapolsky (1982). 
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